Contrary to what has been reported, the recent Saudi-led coalition consultations in Riyadh do not seek to resolve the conflict between the internationally recognized government of President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi and the Southern Transitional Council. Rather, its aim is to pave the way for the formation of a new government that better represents the interests of Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, by appointing their representatives in it.

Today, Yemen is divided into three regions: The first region in the north is controlled by the Ansar Allah group, which is backed by Iran and is more commonly known as the Houthi movement. As for the second region, it is in the possession of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council in the south, and the Republican Guard along the western coast, led by the nephew of the late Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The third region in the eastern provinces is under the fragile Hadi government's hegemony. Thus, after more than five years of conflict, the government is facing not only the Houthis, who took control of Sanaa in September 2014, but also the Southern Transitional Council, which expelled the government from Aden, and declared self-rule in April 2020. Added to this, the rise of Local and hybrid governance in the governorates of Shabwa, Ma’rib, and Hadramout, which, although nominally under Hadi’s authority, the strong local governance system in it is an indication of the weakness of the central government’s authority.

Since last year, the Houthis have succeeded in advancing on several fronts, in Al-Bayda, Marib and Al-Jawf. The Southern Transitional Council also continued its war against the government forces in Abyan and also managed, in another development, to tighten its grip on the island of Socotra in late June. Although the steps taken by the STC had the full support of the UAE, they also seemed to enjoy the approval of Saudi Arabia, especially since they all occurred shortly after the visit of Aidarous al-Zubaidi, the head of the STC, to Riyadh. Likewise, the Saudis refused to provide support to the local authorities in Socotra, and even facilitated the advance of the Southern Transitional Council forces towards Hadibu, the capital of Socotra.

Saudi Arabia, which intervened in Yemen to restore Hadi's legitimate government to power in the country, does not seem committed to this goal now. The weakness and fragmentation of the Hadi government encouraged its opponents and allies to control the lands under its authority and the authorities of its institutions, while it became unable even to return to the areas nominally under its control, not to mention the lands it lost to the Houthis and the Southern Transitional Council.

The disintegration of the Hadi government is the result of two dynamics: First, it is the leadership of the government, given that most of the ministers and officials are in exile, and do not bear responsibility for what is happening inside Yemen. All they do is exchange accusations and blame each other.

The second reason is Saudi Arabia's control over the decision-making process in the government, especially during the past three years. This prompted some Yemeni officials to make public statements rejecting the nature of their relationship with the Saudi-led coalition. In fact, the Saudis make the decision even in the routine business of the government, for example, Yemenis have to obtain Saudi approval for travel documents before issuing them. On the other hand, Yemeni diplomatic sources pointed out in private conversations that a decision had recently been issued to link Yemeni embassies directly with Saudi embassies. Once this decision becomes effective, Saudi Arabia will ensure that Yemeni diplomatic decisions are fully under its control.

Recently, however, Riyadh has begun to change its strategy. The fact that the Saudis did not prevent the Southern Transitional Council from taking over Socotra suggests that they have decided to move forward with the southern separatists, while at the same time working to strengthen their relationship with the UAE. At the same time, Saudi military forces are still deployed across this island to protect Riyadh's interests.

In the wake of the developments in Socotra, Saudi Arabia reinvigorated the Riyadh Agreement, which was signed by the Hadi government and the Southern Transitional Council in November 2019. However, this agreement, which was supposed to be implemented within 90 days, did not see the light due to ambiguity. Its content and the conflicting agendas of the UAE and Saudi Arabia at the time. One of the main points of disagreement was that priority should have been given to the military dimension in the agreement, followed by the political dimension. The Southern Transitional Council was supposed to integrate its forces with the military institutions of the Hadi government, but this did not happen. Today, the Saudis are putting pressure on the government to implement the political side of the agreement and share power with the Southern Transitional Council. The Saudi-led coalition puts the formation of a new government at the top of its priorities that is more in line with its thinking and views. This may allow, in light of the growing criticism within the institutions of the Hadi government, to exclude people who stand in the way of the new coalition approach.

It is likely that the Riyadh agreement will result in the formation of a new government that will be completely controlled by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which will guarantee the latter its influence in the south and along the western coast of Yemen, without encountering any government opposition. As the government's new partner, the STC will preserve Emirati interests. In turn, the Saudis will be able to use their influence in the new government to protect and secure their interests during negotiations with the Houthis.

However, the inclusion of southern separatists in the government will only exacerbate its disintegration, given that the main goal of the Southern Transitional Council, according to its literature, is the secession of the south and not work under the umbrella of a unified state, and thus this will lead to more failures and the outbreak of a new round of conflict on the ground. .

Ultimately, Yemenis will find themselves south and north with a government that is far removed from their suffering: a government whose main priority is to defend the interests of Yemen.