From time to time, internal conflicts erupt between the armed formations of the Transitional Council, which are supported by the UAE. The most recent of which was the bloody confrontations in the "Crater" neighborhood, in the center of Aden, on the first of October, between the former commander of Camp Twenty of the "Transitional Council," Imam al-Nubi, and forces affiliated with the "Transitional Council." It led to dozens of deaths and injuries, and had direct effects on security and stability in the city, until it calmed down due to what was said to be Saudi pressure exerted on the conflicting parties.

This event comes in light of a state of security chaos in the interim capital, Aden, the latest of which was the targeting of the convoy of the governorate, Ahmed Hamid Lamlas, with a car bomb.

Perhaps the most important question in this matter: What are the reasons for the confrontations in Aden? What is the impact of this on the future of the "transitional council" in light of this conflict and security chaos?

event contexts:

The nature of the events that took place inside Aden, between the armed formations of the Emirati-backed "Transitional Council", is governed by several factors revealed by a number of temporal and spatial contexts. The recent confrontations have proven that the conflict between these formations may reach the level of armed conflict over influence and interests, within the framework of the competition between their leaders.

First: Confrontations between direct and indirect causes:

The most common version of the cause of the conflict, which took place recently in Aden, is that the former commander of Camp Twenty, Imam al-Nubi, arrested a number of Crater policemen, including a relative of the commander of the "security belt" in Lahj governorate, on Friday evening, the first of October. Saleh Al-Sayed, in response to the police station’s arrest of Nubian members, during the recent protests in the city condemning the deterioration of the situation. However, reality testifies to the existence of other indirect reasons for this conflict. The events of "Crater" are only one of the reflections of these causes. Perhaps the most important of them:

Conflict of interest and influence struggle:

Most of the leaders of the Transitional Council are not subject to a single goal, and are motivated by different personal ambitions. These leaderships do not emanate from a clear and coherent combat doctrine, and this was reflected - in turn - on the existing differences between these leaders, due to the conflict of interests and the struggle for influence, at the level of investments, trade, state resources, lands and public utilities.

Evidence for this is Aidarous Al-Zubaidi’s disagreement with the Support and Support Command, represented by Mohsen Al-Wali and his deputy, Nabil Al-Mashoushi, which led to an explosion of events last June, between the forces of the Third Brigade Support and Support and the Eighth Sector “Security Belt”, and resulted in deaths and injuries. For reasons related to sharing the revenues of the security and military points, which are subject to the "security belt" forces and the "support and support forces", whose size is estimated at 20 million Yemeni riyals per day. Commander Muhsin al-Wali refused to share these revenues on the pretext that the rest of the forces, such as the Aden Security Forces and the Storm Forces, have the revenues of the port and the qat markets, and many other revenues.

Regional conflict:

Most of the armed formations affiliated with the "Transitional Council" are subject to leaders from other provinces, other than the city of Aden, and the presence of the people of the city of Aden is very limited. The Al-Isnad and Al-Hizam forces, which control northern Aden, are predominantly occupied by the people of the Yafea districts, while the Al-Asifa and Police forces are dominated by the people of Al-Dhalea. There is a fierce struggle between the Yafea axis and the Al-Dhalea axis in the council, where the Yafei side, led by Mohsen Al-Wali, Nabil Al-Mashushi, Hadar, and Nasser Al-Shouti, enjoys the support of the leader in the transitional presidency, Abdul Rahman Sheikh Al-Yafei. While the al-Dhalei party, led by Shalal Shaya and Abdul-Daim al-Dhalei, has the support of Fadl Hassan al-Dhalei, Fadl al-Jaadi and Abdul Salam Hamid, and this party controls the storm forces that control large parts of Aden, security and military.

April Longley Alley, former director of the International Crisis Group for the Middle East and North Africa, conducted a survey in Aden, in which she concluded that there is a perception that the "security belt" forces in Aden rely too much on the personnel they recruit from Al-Dhalea and Lahj, and that The Southern Transitional Council does not adequately represent Aden.

This state of relying on security and military formations based on the regional dimension, with the absence of a combative doctrine, conflict over interests, and competition for influence, leads to cycles of internal conflict, as happened in the eighties of the last century during the era of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. From time to time, it raises the sensitivity of the people of Aden, who feel that their city is a battleground for the conflicting parties from outside, and it also raises the sensitivity of the rest of the Southern Governorates belonging to the "Transitional Council".